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Irregular War, Local Community  
and Intimate Violence in Spain (1939-1952) 
Jorge Marco and Mercedes Yusta Rodrigo 
 “No category of human beings are more cruel than a threatened 
ruling class, which feels itself on historical, economic and 
cultural grounds to be a natural “elite”, and which finds itself 
challenged by an inchoate mass which will no longer recognize 
its privileges”1 
In contrast to other European countries, where armed antifascist resistance was a 
direct result of military occupation by a foreign power, the political violence experienced 
in Spain, until at least the mid-1950s was a continuation of the violence set in motion by 
the military coup of July 1936 and the ensuing bloody civil war. On the one side, the 
dictatorship continued its ferocious repression throughout the following decade with 
the active participation of a certain proportion of the population. Meanwhile, on the 
other side, some of the defeated did not lay down their arms after  1st April 1939 but 
organized themselves politically and militarily, particularly in the countryside, to 
continue the resistance against Francoism. The continued presence of this movement 
was used by the dictatorship to justify both tougher repressive legislation and the 
policies of repression and control of the population. Thus, the anti-Francoist guerrilla 
movement emerged as a result of the prolongation of the armed conflict and, to a large 
extent, reproduced the violence of the war.  
                                                        
1 Jackson, G. Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 
305 
 2 
This factor differentiates the Spanish anti-Francoist movement from other 
European antifascist resistance movements, which arose during WWII in response to 
invasion by foreign occupying forces. This would explain how resistance movements 
such as those in Italy and Yugoslavia were able to mobilize so much more of the 
population than occurred in Spain.2 However, the resistance in Spain was irrevocably 
linked to the European conflict. The evolution of the war in Europe was decisive in the 
development of the conflict within Spain. Furthermore, a significant number of the 
guerrillas fighting in Spain had previous combat experience with the French Resistance, 
particularly those groups sent to Spain by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE).3 This 
had important consequences for the development of the anti-Francoist guerrilla forces 
and the violence in which they were involved. Nevertheless, the armed strategy of the 
PCE was different when compared with the rest of the communist parties in the 1940s. 
The PCF in France and the PCI in Italy followed the instructions of Stalin to the letter, 
disarming the maquisards and partigiani after the end of World War II. On the contrary, 
the KKE in Greece and the PCY in Yugoslavia contradicted these instructions by carrying 
out a revolutionary war.4 The insistence of the PCE on the armed struggle in Spain in 
the 1940s had nothing to do with a revolutionary commitment, but with the survival of 
a fascist dictatorship after the end of the Second World War. 
                                                        
2 The figures are always controversial. However, it is thought that, in 1945, Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia may 
have numbered around 800.000. In Italy, there are believed to have been more than 200.000 partigiani, while, in 
Spain, there were between 6.000 and 8.000. On Yugoslavia: Cohen, P. J. Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and 
the Deceit of History. Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1996, p. 96. On Italy, see: La Guerra popolare di 
Liberazione – La Resistenza (in cifre) http://www.storiaxxisecolo.it/Resistenza/cifre.html (accessed 13 January 
2018); On Spain: Serrano, S. Maquis. Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2002, pp. 
381-382 and Marco, J. The Long Nocturnal March: The Spanish Guerrilla Movement in the European Narrative 
of Antifascist Resistance, 1936-1952. In: Anderson and Arco, M. A. (eds) Grappling with the Past: Mass Violence 
in Spain 1936 – 1952. New York: Routledge, 2015, p. 179. 
3 Marco, The Long Nocturnal March, pp. 181-184 
4 Judt, T. Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939-1948. London: Routledge, 1989 
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The aim of the present study is to analyse the violence relating to the armed anti-
Francoist resistance in Spain, considering it as a continuation of the conflict which 
began in 1936. With this in mind, we believe that the violence experienced in the 
countryside, specifically that involved in the repression of the armed resistance 
movement and its support networks, followed the pattern of the war, especially in the 
facet of “intimate violence”.5 An important hypothesis of this study involves the decisive 
role of the “primary” groups (family members, neighbours and friends) in the 
development of violence linked to the resistance, both in the structure of the resistance 
movement and in the repressive policies of the dictatorship. However, our focus on the 
importance of community networks based on kinship, the neighbourhood and 
friendship does not imply the depoliticization of anti-Francoist resistance. On the 
contrary, the present study emphasizes the fact that primary groups were key vectors 
for politicization and that Francoism, well aware of this, violently attacked them. 
Paradoxically, this policy of repression served to further politicize these groups by 
criminalizing entire families or groups without distinguishing individual 
responsibilities. Consequently, the analysis of post-war resistance and the resulting 
violence requires consideration of the two dimensions, political and personal, which 
shaped both the reasoning behind the violence and the groups against whom it was 
directed.  
 
1. Wartime and post-war violence: “brutalization”, repression and resistance 
 
                                                        
5 Kalyvas, S. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 330-363. 
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While there has recently been an increase in the number of studies of political 
violence in post-war Spain, most either ignore the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement or 
pay it little attention. The violence is thus analysed exclusively on the basis of it being 
unidirectional Francoist repression, which tends to mask important reasons, dynamics 
and interactions. One of the most noteworthy is the formation of the anti-Francoist 
resistance movement as a result of the “brutalization” of social relationships during the 
war and post-war.6 In the present study we consider that the level of “brutalization” 
attained by the repression in certain rural zones of Spain cannot be understood without 
the inclusion of the armed resistance factor in the analysis of the post-war political 
violence.  
It must be remembered that July 1936 was not when a civil war started in Spain, 
but rather it was when a coup d’etat took place, with a clearly defined plan for mass 
violence. Once the coup had failed and the war had started, the violent Francoist 
coalition designed and implemented a program of political cleansing against “internal 
enemies”, which continued during the post-war.7 Political violence had been inherent in 
the construction of the Francoist state from the moment of the coup in 1936: in the words 
of Pablo Gil Vico, “the suppression and social control of the enemy were the essential 
and inescapable aims of the New State”.8 Historians specialising in this period also point 
to a relationship between the social conflict of the Second Republic and the violence 
                                                        
6 An initial analysis of guerrilla violence, in Yusta, M. Una guerra que no dice su nombre: los usos de la violencia 
en el contexto de la guerrilla antifranquista, 1939-1953. Historia Social 2008; 61; Marco, J. Una Corea en pequeño: 
Contrainsurgencia y represión de la guerrilla en España. Contenciosa 2013; 1; Díaz, B. Tiempos de violencia 
desigual: guerrilleros contra Franco. Vínculos de Historia 2016; 5  
7 Rodrigo, J. Hasta la raíz. Violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura franquista. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
2009, pp. 37-42; Prada, J. La España masacrada. La represión franquista  de guerra y posguerra. Madrid: Alianza 
Editorial, 2010, pp. 119-162; Gómez Bravo G. and Marco, J. La obra del miedo, Violencia y sociedad en la España 
franquista, 1936-1950. Barcelona: Península, 2011, pp. 95-115. 
8 Gil Vico, P. Derecho y ficción: la represión judicial militar. In: Espinosa F. (ed) Violencia roja y azul: España, 
1936-1950. Barcelona: Crítica, 2010, p. 279. 
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which took place in the areas captured by the Francoists.9 This relationship continued 
into the post-war period in some provinces of Andalusia such as Córdoba or in eastern 
Aragón, areas where there was later significant guerrilla activity. The class aspect of 
Francoist repression is also important as this was often directed at specific social sectors, 
such as farm labourers, who had posed a threat to the social order during the Republic. 
Although the violence during and after the war was part of the same process of 
repression, from 1st April 1939 it was increasingly implemented through institutional 
channels. The imposition of new legislative and bureaucratic mechanisms tended to 
generalize the process of repression and social control via a structure of tribunals and 
police forces. Thus, the defeated were trapped in a complex network of repressive bodies 
responsible for a large number of accusations at a local level.10 The Francoist dictatorship 
was characterized by its “structural policy of repression”. 11 The aim was to first paralyze 
the “internal enemy” and then implement a policy of cleansing which would strip it of 
its identity and political intention. To achieve this, it was vital to involve a part of the 
population: “the terror accompanying the Francoist “new order” was not (…) an alien 
construct to be imposed on the population, but an instrument of domination whose 
efficacy was only possible with the cooperation of some of its citizens”.12 As a result of 
                                                        
9 Gil Vico, Derecho y ficción, p. 286. For Andalucía and Extremadura, see: Espinosa, F. La Justicia de Queipo. 
Barcelona, Crítica, 2006. For eastern Aragón: Ledesma, J. L. Una retaguardia al rojo. Las violencias en la zona 
republicana. In: Espinosa, Violencia roja y azul, p. 167  
10 Mir, C. Vivir es sobrevivir. Justicia, orden y marginación en la Cataluña rural de posguerra. Lleida: Editorial 
Milenio, 2000, pp. 189-237; Anderson, P. The Francoist Military Trials. New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 74-91; 
Gómez Bravo and Marco, La obra del miedo, pp. 179-200; Gil, P. La noche de los generales. Militares y represión 
en la época de Franco. Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2004, pp. 166-175. 
11 Saz I. and Gómez Roda, A. El franquismo en Valencia. Formas de vida y actitudes sociales en la posguerra. 
Valencia: Episteme, 1999, cited in Rodríguez Barreira, O. Migas con miedo. Prácticas de resistencia al primer 
franquismo. Almería, 1939-1953. Almería: Universidad de Almería, 2008, p. 38. See also Aróstegui, J. Coerción, 
Violencia, Exclusión. La dictadura de Franco como sistema represivo. In: Aróstegui, J. (ed) Franco: la represión 
como sistema. Barcelona: Flor del Viento, 2012, p. 22. 
12 Prada Rodríguez, La España masacrada, p. 359; Cenarro A. Muerte y subordinación en la España franquista: 
El imperio de la violencia como base del "nuevo estado". Historia Social 1998; 30  
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the collaboration of ordinary citizens, thousands of the defeated were sent to 
concentration camps, prisons or punishment battalions. Between the end of 1939 and 
the beginning of 1940 it is estimated that around one million of the defeated were treated 
in this way.13 However, the prolonged internment of so many created enormous social 
unrest. Official reports show how the dictatorship began to fear a popular uprising in 
conjunction with the anti-Francoist guerrilla groups, particularly when the Allies began 
to gain the upper hand in WWII. As a result, the dictatorship substantially reduced the 
number of people imprisoned. From this moment on, the mechanisms of social control 
were largely transferred from the prisons and concentration camps to the towns and 
cities. 14 
The local area was ideal for surveillance of the population, “especially in rural areas 
where people have close relationships and everyone knows one another”.15 Thus, “the 
atmosphere in small communities changed dramatically as they became cruel, 
inhospitable places where there was no place for any sign of left-wing or republican 
leanings”.16 The formation of the “Juntas Locales de Libertad Vigilada” (Local Parole 
Monitoring Boards) in 1943 signalled a new phase of the institutionalization of social 
control by the victors over the defeated, on giving the prominent people of each area the 
power to monitor the movements of anyone on parole. By closely involving sectors of 
the population in the tasks of repression and social control, the dictatorship was laying 
the foundations for their support and loyalty while, at the same time, causing “a deep 
                                                        
13 Molinero, C. et. al. (eds) Una inmensa prisión. Los campos de concentración y las prisiones durante la guerra 
civil y el franquismo. Barcelona, Crítica, 2003; Rodrigo, J. Cautivos. Campos de concentración en la España 
franquista, 1936-1947. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005. 
14 Marco, J. States of War: “Being Civilian” in 1940s Spain. In: Graham, H. (ed) Interrogating Francoism: history 
and dictatorship in twentieth-century Spain. London: Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 164-165. 
15 Prada Rodríguez, La España masacrada, p. 363 
16 Rodríguez Barreira, Migas con miedo, p. 51. 
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fracture in society which largely explains the nature of the post-war violence and its 
“intimacy” at local level”.17 
The birth of the armed resistance movement against the dictatorship is directly 
related to the dimensions and cruelty of the repression during and after the war. It had 
its origins in those who, having suffered reprisals at the hands of the Francoists, had 
hidden in the mountains and formed the first nuclei of resistance. After the war, 
communities (particularly in rural areas) were broken and bitterly divided into victors 
and defeated. In areas controlled by the Republican government during the war, such as 
parts of Andalusia and Aragón, the trauma of the revolutionary violence caused the 
eventual victors to become heavily involved in the repression of the defeated. Former 
Republican soldiers, on returning to their towns and villages from the prisons and 
concentration camps, were stigmatized, shunned and constantly harassed by their 
neighbours and the local authorities.18 These formed the nucleus of those who went into 
hiding immediately after the war and who would later collaborate with the guerrillas or 
become one themselves. As shown by Peter Anderson in his study of the town of 
Pozoblanco (Córdoba), most of those who had fled, and their contacts, had suffered 
persecution at the hands of the military courts.19 This was the typical biography of an 
anti-Francoist guerrilla in Spain. However, the consequences went beyond the 
individual and eventually impregnated the family and local networks of each guerrilla.  
 
                                                        
17 Gómez Bravo and Marco, La obra del miedo, pp. 293-313. 
18 Hernández Burgos, C. Les dynamiques locales et quotidiennes de la répression franquiste, 1936-1950. 
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’Histoire, 2015 ; 127 
19 Anderson, The Francoist Military Trials, pp. 141-144 
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2. Local community: networks of family, friends and neighbours.  
The brothers José and Belisario Lavín Cobo were two of the many who fled to the 
mountains during the war to escape Francoist violence.20 In August 1937, following the 
occupation of Santander by Francoist troops, they sought refuge in the mountains, along 
with other companions from the Republican Army and some of their neighbours. The 
small group spent months of little activity in order not to attract attention from the 
soldiers. However, the calm came to an abrupt end in Spring 1938 when they were 
ambushed by a paramilitary Falangist group led by the local mayor, Manuel Casar. The 
operation resulted in the death of one of the fugitives and the arrest of Belisario, who, 
months later, was sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot. The Falangist 
Manuel Casar, former neighbour and friend of the Lavín Cobo brothers, thus became 
the primary target of José Lavín. Only one month later José avenged his brother’s death 
by shooting Casar four times and killing him. However, this was not the end of the 
violence as Norberto Casar, Manuel’s brother, who was also a Falangist and former friend 
of José, was seeking revenge. In February 1940, almost a year after the end of the war, 
Norberto and José met in the mountains. Norberto had been watching José’s mother for 
months until, one afternoon, she unwittingly led him to his hideout. According to 
witnesses, they first shared a cigarette. Norberto then produced a revolver but it jammed 
as he tried to fire it. At this point, José pulled out his own pistol but Norberto managed 
to get away. However, after a short chase, he caught and killed him. Official reports on 
the case stated that José Lavín had “planned to exterminate the dead man’s family”.21 
                                                        
20  The story of José and Belisario Lavín Cobo is recounted in: Andrés Gómez, V. Del mito a la historia. 
Guerrilleros, maquis y huidos en los montes de Cantabria. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2008, pp. 42-78 
21 Ibid., p. 88 
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 For decades the historiography has interpreted this type of incident exclusively 
as a political conflict between Falangists and anti-Francoist guerrillas without 
considering the anthropological dimension to the violence. The case of the Lavín 
brothers illustrates the part played by key elements such as  kinship, neighbourhood and 
friendship (known as primary groups in anthropology) both in the formation of guerrilla 
groups and in the dynamics of the violence initiated during the war and prolonged 
during the post-war period. The analysis of these components does not depoliticize the 
actions of the guerrillas, nor the Francoist repression or the dynamics of the violence. 
On the contrary, recent studies have shown over the years that networks based on 
family, neighbours and friends had a crucial role in the politicization of rural Spanish 
society during the 1930s and 1940s.22 Furthermore, analysis of these elements throws 
light on some aspects which are often hidden by strictly ideological or class-based 
interpretations, particularly with regard to violence. 
In the heart of rural communities the conflict involving the guerrillas had 
unmistakeably local overtones. As James C. Scott noted with regard to conflict in 
agricultural communities: “one cannot talk about class relations and conflicts in such a 
community without recognizing that class relations are profoundly inflected by deep 
personal histories that have shaped them”.23 Javier Ugarte, in his local study on the 
political organization of a community in Navarra during the civil war, observed that “it 
was not ideas nor individual choice that gave shape to the group (…) but, rather, personal 
                                                        
22 Yusta Rodrigo, M. Guerrilla y resistencia campesina. La resistencia armada contra el franquismo en Aragón, 
1939-1952. Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2003; Marco, J. Guerrilleros and Neighbours in Arms: 
Identities and Cultures of Anti-fascist Resistance in Spain. Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 2016; Cabana, A. 
La derrota de lo épico. Valencia: Publications de la Universitat de València, 2013 
23  Scott, J. C. Decoding the Subaltern: Ideology, Disguise, and Resistance in Agrarian Politics. London: 
Routledge, 2013, p. 5 
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ties which implied specific interests, quarrels, sometimes within the family, friendships, 
patronage, etc. which initially shaped the groups”. 24  In the same way, the violence 
connected with the guerrillas cannot always be explained by political or class affinities.  
The primary groups played a vital part in the mobilization and structure of the 
guerrilla movement in Spain. Although their relevance can be seen throughout the 
latter’s development, their impact was greatest in the early post-war ears. Between 1939 
and 1942 dozens of armed groups organized themselves in the mountains of Spain after 
fleeing Francoist repression. However, these groups were enormously heterogeneous 
ideologically (socialists, anarchists, communists, republicans, etc.) compared to those of 
later years, in which ideology was crucial to their formation. In the early years, as shown 
by the case of José Lavín, the most important elements in the formation of the groups 
were kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. These first guerrillas were not united by 
their belonging to the same political organization but by the primary networks of 
socialization and their persecution by the Francoist dictatorship. Consequently, these 
first groups consisted of brothers, fathers and sons, cousins, neighbours from the village, 
companions from units of the Republican Army, etc. 
These groups, which we have termed “local guerrillas” or “neighbours in arms”,25 
had a special relationship with the local community. Most, or all, of their members were 
part of the community through birth and/or residence. More importantly, they limited 
their radius of action to the village or area to which their members belonged. The close 
links between the guerrillas and the local community were crucial for all aspects of the 
                                                        
24 Ugarte Tellería, J. La nueva Covadonga insurgente. Orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 
en Navarra y el País Vasco. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1998, p. 15. 
25 Yusta Rodrigo, M. La guerra de los vencidos. El maquis en el Maestrazgo turolense, 1940-1950. Zaragoza: 
Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2005, pp. 95-110; Marco, Guerrilleros and Neighbours in Arms, pp. 5-9 
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movement, including the dynamics of violence and counter-insurgency, as will be 
discussed later. However, this model came under threat from 1944 onwards when the 
PCE leadership decided to send political officials to Spain to attempt to form these nuclei 
of resistance into “a real irregular army” of national reach.26 The intention was to combat 
the “localist” tendencies of the peasant guerrillas, following the classical marxist 
guidelines  of the early 20th century.27  
The real influence of the PCE varied from region to region but there was 
cohabitation in all of them, often difficult, between the communists sent from exile in 
France and the local guerrillas. Although both shared the idea of anti-fascism they had 
radically different opinions as to how to fight against Franco’s dictatorship. The former 
believed it necessary to increase the influence of the PCE within the armed groups, to 
follow the instructions of their leadership to the letter and to give a clear political 
orientation (i.e. communist) to guerrilla activity, which, in some cases, such as the 
Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante y Aragón (Guerrilla Association of the Levant and 
Aragón) (AGLA), was conceived as the armed wing of the clandestine political 
organization. The latter were fighting, to a large extent, for their own survival and 
understood the fight in a local context. Their objectives had names and addresses and 
they often acted out of a desire for revenge (e.g. for the murder of family members).  
The anti-Francoist guerrilla movement became inextricably embedded in rural 
communities through contact with the population, particularly through the “neighbours 
in arms” or “local guerrillas”. Family groups were often the first to be recruited by the 
                                                        
26 The first orders appeared in 1943: SOTO, L. Los campesinos gallegos en lucha implacable contra Franco y la 
Falange. Nuestra Bandera, 30 April 1943. 
27 Marco, Guerrilleros and Neighbours in Arms, p. 98. 
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guerrillas to form part of their network of contacts and collaborators. As Ana Cabana 
has pointed out, go-between networks were based on family, neighbourhood and 
friendship, plus political affinity, humanitarian feelings and economic interest. 28  
Consequently, these families became involved in the resistance movement and in 
activities considered subversive, thus exposing themselves to the possibility of 
repression. On the other hand, due to their close contact with the population, the 
guerrillas often mediated in disputes within the community. These often had their 
origins in the civil war but sometimes dated from long before and were often related to 
typical rural issues, such as land use and ownership.29 
The studies carried out at local level in eastern Andalusia or in the provinces of 
Teruel, Cuenca and Castellón, on which our analysis is based, show that interpersonal 
relationships involving family, friendship, patronage or neighbours are equally as 
significant as ideological affinities when examining the meaning and aims of violence, 
particularly that of the guerrillas, while the violence of the Francoist State tended to be 
more indiscriminate.  
 
3. Guerrillas and the use of violence 
 The use of violence by the anti-Francoist resistance was noticeably lower than in 
similar movements in the rest of Europe due to three main factors: 1) the strong links 
between the anti-Francoist guerrillas and the local community where they were active 
generally tended to inhibit the use of violence; 2) the development of their activities 
                                                        
28 Cabana, La derrota de lo épico, pp. 195-221 
29 Yusta Rodrigo, Guerrilla y resistencia campesina, pp. 45-62 
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took place in the post-war period rather than in the context of a war of occupation; 3) 
the lack of a final phase of liberation and victory, which, in other countries, led to a sharp 
increase in violence.  
In terms of physical elimination, anti-Francoist guerrillas killed 953 civilians 
between 1939 and 1952.30 During the four years of the Nazi occupation of Greece (1941-
1944), a country with a population four times smaller than that of Spain, guerrillas killed 
around 15.000 civilians.31 Comparison of the two figures clearly shows the low levels of 
physical violence employed by the anti-Francoist guerrillas. Another characteristic of 
anti-Francoist violence was that it was generally selective, which was not always the case 
in other parts of Europe.32 The selective nature of the anti-Francoist violence was due to 
the great number of local guerrillas and their close ties to the local community. The low 
use of violence and the fact that all participants knew each other obviously did not 
favour the use of indiscriminate violence.  
However, there was some regional variation in both the intensity and the nature 
of the guerrilla violence. The provinces with the highest levels of killings were Asturias 
(148), Málaga (82), Coruña (75), León (75), Orense (74) and Granada (73), where both 
local groups of various ideologies and groups directed by the PCE were active. However, 
in the areas where the AGLA, the group most closely linked to the PCE and with the 
most guerrilla fighters were active, the levels of violence were lower: Teruel (43), Cuenca 
(35), Castellón (16), Valencia (15), Tarragona (3).33 There are two fundamental reasons 
that explain these regional variations. In the first place, the AGLA began its armed 
                                                        
30 Aguado Sánchez, F. El maquis en España. Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1975, pp. 253-254. 
31 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 249. 
32 An extensive analysis of the selective and indiscriminate nature of the violence in Greece: Kalyvas, The Logic 
of Violence in Civil War, pp. 246-329. 
33 Aguado Sánchez, El maquis en España, pp. 253-254. 
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activity at the end of 1944, while in the other regions armed activity began in 1939. 
Secondly, the AGLA was characterized as a predominantly political rather than military 
guerrilla group due to its close liaison with the Central Committee of the PCE in exile, 
in contrast to the rest of the guerrilla groups, whose political isolation reinforced the 
military sphere over politics. 
This region had a long history of social and political struggle, particularly in the 
Maestrazgo mountains between the provinces of Teruel and Castellón. The tradition of 
peasant guerrillas here dates back to at least the 1830s and the legitimist uprisings known 
as the Carlist Wars. 34  During the Second Republic, these areas were the scene of 
insurrectional movements, especially the south of Teruel and the provinces of Castellón 
and Valencia while, during the civil war, the Maestrazgo was in the hands of the 
republicans for a long period. It was thus possible to implement revolutionary processes 
such as the collectivization of land, which, in some areas, was accompanied by high 
levels of violence. The arrival of the Francoist army and the end of the war reversed the 
direction of the repression, which was intensified by the desire for vengeance on the part 
of some of those who had previously suffered reprisals.35 The memory of the violence 
suffered by each side profoundly affected the violence of the post-war period: to a large 
extent, the violence involving the anti-Francoist resistance can be seen as both a 
reflection and a continuation of the violence experienced during the war. 
La AGLA was created by the PCE leadership in France, from where it sent armed 
groups to Spain at the end of 1944. They found a society which was only superficially 
                                                        
34 Rújula, P. Contrarrevolución. Realismo y carlismo en Aragón y el Maestrazgo, 1820-1840. Zaragoza, Prensas 
Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2011. 
35 An initial total estimate of the number of victims of repression (Francoist and republican) during the war and 
post-war in Julia, S. Victimas de la guerra civil. Barcelona: Critica, 2001. A more recent account: Espinosa, 
Violencia roja y azul, pp. 77-78, 247 
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pacified, in which a sector of the population had experienced, or were still experiencing, 
Francoist repression. 36  Although the vast majority of the Spanish rural population 
avoided any political engagement, 37  a significant number of peasants committed 
themselves to helping the armed movement and some, particularly those who had held 
positions of responsibility during the Republic and the war or had been imprisoned for 
their activities during the war (which were often the same) joined the guerrilla groups.38 
However, in addition to political affinities, personal ties also played an important part 
in the creation of these networks. Fathers and sons, brothers, neighbours and relatives 
became involved together in the guerrilla support networks or even joined the resistance 
groups.39 Many women also participated in the networks of contacts and support in this 
way, although this did not mean that they had no previous ideological commitment. 
This was noted by the forces of repression, who were already applying the principle of 
family responsibility in cases of repression connected with wartime activities.  
The orders from the PCE leadership in exile in France clearly specified what should 
be the objectives of the guerrilla struggle, centred on the AGLA, calling for “(…) the 
execution of any magistrate sentencing a patriot to death (…) followed by the execution 
of any Falangist leaders responsible for the wave of crime and terror. This should be 
carried out by guerrillas but any Spaniard with a pistol or knife can and must do the 
                                                        
36 On 1st February 1943, the prison population accused of “marxist rebellion” totalled 104,286. Source: Anuario 
Estadístico 1944-1945. On the other hand, in September 1946 the communist newspaper Mundo Obrero gave a 
figure of 223,503 prisoners released on probation 
37 Hernández Burgos, C. The Triumph of ‘Normality’, Social Attitudes, Popular Opinion and the Construction 
of the Franco Regime in Post-War Rural Spain (1936–1952). European History Quarterly, 2016; 46-2 
38 The biographies of many guerrillas of the AGLA are found in Sánchez Cervelló J. (ed) Maquis: el puño que 
golpeó al franquismo. La Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante y Aragón. Barcelona: Flor de Viento Ediciones, 
2003, pp. 432-489. 
39 There are many examples: the brothers Vicente Zafón de Mosqueruela, Isidro and Francisco Serrano Iranzo de 
Castellote, Florencio Guillen father and son from Gúdar are among the best-known. 
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same”.40 However, the reality of the territory in which the AGLA were operating was 
much more complicated than a simple division between Falangist executioners and anti-
Francoist patriots. Furthermore, the guerrillas tended to base themselves in sparsely 
populated mountainous areas, far from political or industrial centres, which made the 
task of striking specific targets even more difficult. Nonetheless, the communist 
leadership saw the AGLA as an armed vanguard which could be used to attack the 
regime hierarchy and even Franco himself.41 However, the arrest of the AGLA leadership 
in Valencia between January and March 1947 forced the guerrillas to retreat into the 
mountains and put paid to the idea of combining the mountain bases with urban 
guerrilla activity. After this point guerrilla activities would be almost entirely confined 
to the mountains and opportunities to damage the regime’s infrastructure were limited 
to the sabotage of small electrical substations and to the railways. The violence of the 
guerrillas consequently became ever more localist and intrapersonal, tending to revolve 
around settling scores with the local authorities, individuals involved in repression and 
people who had informed on the guerrillas or their support network. 
Guerrilla violence was also directed at the group itself, almost from the moment of 
the group’s inception. The creation of the AGLA and the establishment of the leadership 
in Valencia was accompanied by a restructuring of the pre-existing armed groups that 
was probably not to the liking of all the guerrillas. Some of the tensions were swiftly 
dealt with by eliminating dissatisfied members accused of being “agents provocateurs”. 
                                                        
40 Carta abierta de la Delegación del Comité Central a los miembros del partido, simpatizantes y a todos los 
antifranquistas en general”, Nuestra Bandera. Revista de orientación política, económica y cultural, January 1945, 
p. 10. 
41 The AGLA leadership had planned to carry out acts in Valencia during Franco’s visit to the city in spring 1947. 
‘Informe del Comandante en jefe de la AGL del 18 de enero de 1947’. Military Trial 371-V-47. Fondo de Justicia 
Militar, TMT n° 1. Archivo Histórico de Defensa (AHD), 
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In some cases, such as that of José Ramiá Ciprés, nicknamed “Petrol”, and assassinated 
in December 1946 on the order of the leadership, these members were affiliated to the 
anarchists. 42  Other internal executions were a result of the paranoia affecting the 
leadership with regard to possible police infiltration, exacerbated by the fall of the 
communist leadership in Madrid in November 1946 and encouraged by the party 
leadership in France who had made “the fight against agents provocateurs” one of their 
priorities. Orders regarding the fight against “provocateurs”, especially in the case of 
newly-recruited members, were a constant feature of the correspondence between 
Vicente Galarza “Andrés“, the leader of the AGL in Valencia and the guerrilla leaders. 43  
Juan Ramón Delicado, the leader of one of the guerrilla groups which had entered from 
France and who had a wealth of experience as an official in the French Forces of the 
Interior (FFI) was a victim of these internal purges. After being arrested by the police, 
tortured, and then released, his guerrilla companions were suspicious of his release and 
eventually assassinated him in the mountains on 17th November 1946 on the orders of 
one of the section heads of the AGL.44 
The dual political and personal logic directing the violence carried out by the anti-
Francoist resistance can be observed from the very first acts performed by armed groups 
in the zone. Their targets were individuals connected with repression at local level or 
local regime members, reported to the group by the inhabitants of the zone.45 This way 
                                                        
42 ‘Informe del camarada Ibáñez sobre Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante’, 14 July 1947, Archivo Histórico del 
Comité Central del Partido Comunista de España (AHCCPCE), Movimiento Guerrillero, jacquet 3, p. 10; El 
bandolero Petrol ajusticiado. El guerrillero 1947; 3 
43 Military Trial 371-V-47 (AHD). See also Carrillo, S. Hay que luchar mejor contra la provocación. Nuestra 
Bandera. Revista de educación ideológica del Partido Comunista de España 1950; 4, pp. 96-146. 
44 ‘Informe del camarada Ibáñez sobre Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante’, 14 July 1947, (AHCCPCE) pp. 8-9. 
A study on internal violence within guerrilla groups in Andalusia, see: Marco, Guerrilleros and Neighbours in 
Arms, pp. 121-128, 209. 
45 The first two assassinations attributed to guerrillas in Teruel of which we have knowledge were those of Balbina 
Puerto, wife of the mayor of Cañada de Benatanduz, in August 1945 and Manuel Garcia Monforte, local Falange 
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of thinking became even more accentuated and the guerrillas often mediated in quarrels 
and disputes. It must be remembered that political and social relationships were 
extremely endogamous and these were usually very small communities. Consequently, 
a political assassination (e.g. that of a Francoist mayor) would lead to personal animosity 
and a desire for vengeance. Thus, as well as fulfilling their role in political resistance they 
often meted out a type of “popular justice”. Furthermore, the actions of the guerrillas 
would often trigger violent reactions from the forces of repression leading to “spirals of 
violence”, of which the majority of victims were civilians. As the repression spread like 
oil over the community it became the main source of violence experienced by the 
population in the guerrilla zones. 
The village of Gúdar (Teruel), with 437 inhabitants in 1944, is an extreme example 
of the nature of “intimate violence” in which political conflict, personal networks and 
state repression combine to tragic effect. On 28th September 1946 Felisa Montolio, the 
wife of the guerrilla Florencio Guillen “Pinchol” was arrested. The next day she was 
found dead in her cell. According to the Civil Guard, she had committed suicide. 
However, her husband and three children always insisted that she had been beaten to 
death by her captors. The eldest son, Florencio, joined his father in the mountains. A 
year later, on 29th September 1947, a group of guerrilla fighters (around 30, according to 
witnesses) entered the village, attacked the Civil Guard post and assassinated the 
previous mayor, Víctor Bayo, and seven members of his family, including two children. 
The Bayo family were considered responsible for the arrests of Felisa and of other 
neighbours who supported the guerrillas. In this case, the brutal violence, which is 
                                                        
boss in Dos Torres de Mercader, in November1945. In both cases, oral accounts mention quarrels and conflict 
with neighbours to add to the political motives of the killings. Archivo Histórico Provincial de Teruel (AHPT), 
sección Gobierno Civil, caja 1130, carpetas 121, 133 y 136.   
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without parallel in the roll of anti-Francoist guerrilla actions, was directly related not 
only to the desire for revenge (both Florencio Guillén, father and son, were directly 
involved in the action, which took place on the anniversary of Felisa’s death), but also 
to long-running feuds within the village: Gúdar had been the scene of violent conflict 
during the civil war, involving the families Bayo and Guillén. Furthermore, Florencio 
Guillén, had led the management committee during the revolutionary period when the 
village’s land was collectivized. For this act, he was tried and imprisoned. Later, when 
on parole, he fled to the mountains and joined the guerrillas. A detailled study by José 
Ramón Sanchís shows that behind the killings was a tangled web of quarrels and 
disputes which had deeply divided the community and in which family loyalties were 
superimposed onto political divisions.46 
The wave of violence did not stop here: the murders in Gúdar triggered 
indiscriminate repression, led personally by the civil governor of the province, General 
Manuel Pizarro. The authorities arrested 22 people, chosen at random from amongst the 
local left-wingers in Gúdar and a neighbouring village, who were then killed and buried 
in a mass grave in the mountains, which was not found and identified until 2006. In 
response to a brutal act, involving a mixing of political and personal feelings, in which 
the victims were chosen for their supposed responsibility in the death of Felisa Montolio 
or for being members of the same family, the regime responded with a much more 
generalized and indiscriminate type of violence which sought neither justice nor 
revenge, but to terrorize any potential supporters of the guerrillas. 
                                                        
46 Sanchís Alfonso, J. R. Maquis: una historia falseada. La Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante: desde los orígenes 
hasta 1947. Zaragoza: Gobierno de Aragón – Asociación Pozos de Caudé, 2007. The political activity of Florencio 
Guillén in pp. 162-167. Mass killings in Gúdar and the aftermath, pp. 566-580, 911-940, 945-958, 995-1003. 
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4. The violence of counterinsurgency 
The elements of “brutalization” shown by the violence in Gúdar reflect the new 
parameters of modern warfare, in which the civilian population plays an important part 
in mobilization while also becoming a military target. At the start of the 20th century 
the techniques of occupation and pacification used in colonial wars were introduced to 
Europe. Franco and his fellow soldiers with experience in North Africa provided a good 
example of this during the Spanish Civil War.47 The greater involvement of guerrilla 
groups in the 20th century exacerbated this tendency. Guerrilla warfare is characterized 
by the ability of the guerrillas to “move like fish through the sea of the people”. This, in 
turn, resulted in the development of new counterinsurgency techniques which 
converted the civil population into an important target.48  
In Spain, the rural civilian population experienced high levels of repression due to 
the close ties of the local community with the anti-Francoist guerrillas. According to 
official records, 19,444 go-betweens and collaborators of the guerrillas were arrested. 
However, some researchers have suggested that the number of collaborators may have 
been 60,000 or even 80,000.49 Although the state of emergency officially ended in 1948, 
in those areas with guerrilla activity it continued until 1951.50 The regime’s official history 
stated that the war had finished on 1st April 1939, but some rural areas, particularly if 
                                                        
47 Balfour, S. Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002; Nerín, G. La guerra que vino de África. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005. 
48 Trinquer, R. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Westport: Praeger Security International, 
2006, p. 16; Galuga, D. Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice. Westport: Praeger Security International, 
2006, pp. xiii-xiv. 
49 Fernández Vargas, V. La resistencia interior en la España de Franco. Madrid: Itsmo, 1981, p. 57; Moreno 
Gómez, F. La Resistencia armada contra Franco. Tragedia del maquis y la guerrilla. Barcelona: Crítica, 2001, p. 
692; Serrano, Maquis, p. 378. 
50 Marco, States of War, p. 159 
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they were mountainous, were effectively a war zone for 16 long years. The dictatorship’s 
violence, carried out by the Civil Guard and the military, had a huge impact which can 
still be observed today.  
 In a context which could be defined as undeclared war the show of state violence 
had a vital role in controlling the population and was intended to destabilize primary 
links and loyalties. The public exhibiting of dead guerrillas is an image often described 
in witnesses’ oral accounts. There are also official records and the testimony of former 
Civil Guards detailling this practice. Manuel Prieto López, a general in the Civil Guard, 
admitted that he had exhibited the bodies of guerrillas “all too often” when he was a 
captain in a small village in Málaga. The law required the body to be put on show if 
unidentified, in order that a neighbour might identify the dead guerrilla. However, 
Manuel admits that he did the same with all dead guerrillas.51 The aim of this practice 
was clearly to spread terror throughout the local community, while acting as a warning 
to those already collaborating with the guerrillas. However, it occasionally had the 
opposite effect, causing go-betweens to flee to the mountains.  
 As a result of this and other repressive policies, hundreds of go-betweens joined 
the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement. Many were brothers, fathers, cousins or uncles 
who helped their relatives by providing information, food, infrastructure, etc. However, 
the women played an even more important part in ensuring the survival of the resistance 
in Spain. As occurred in similar European movements, the women took advantage of 
their traditional roles and their “invisibility” to help family, friends, neighbours and 
                                                        
51 Interview with Manuel Prieto López, in: Romero Navas, J. A. Recuperando la memoria. Málaga: Centro de 
Ediciones de la Diputación de Málaga, 1997, p. 21.  
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comrades in the mountains.52 The Civil Guard, as the main agents of repression of the 
anti-Francoist guerrillas, was aware of the role of women and family in the resistance 
support networks and did not hesitate to target them. The actions of the two men 
entrusted with putting an end to the guerrilla forces in Levant and Andalusia, Manuel 
Pizarro Cenjor and Eulogio Limia Pérez, are worthy of note since they specifically 
targeted the families of guerrillas.53  
 The Civil Guard and the local authorities tended to attack the economies of the 
families of the guerrillas. The aim was to break the spirit of resistance within the social 
networks of the guerrillas while emotionally blackmailing the men in the mountains. 
The message was simple: the misery and suffering of the family was entirely their fault 
for joining the guerrilla groups and would only end when they handed themselves in. 
The authorities employed a variety of tactics. In the case of a family of farm labourers, 
this was usually to exclude them from their normal tasks in the village. If the family 
owned a small amount of land or livestock, these were usually targeted by burning crops 
or farmsteads, cutting down trees and killing the animals. 54  Property was also 
confiscated.55 
 At a higher level on the scale of harassment were the constant arrests, 
interrogations and imprisonments. The least harrowing was to be under arrest for a few 
                                                        
52 Yusta Rodrigo, M. Rebeldía individual, compromiso familiar, acción colectiva. Las mujeres en la resistencia al 
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hours or to have to report to the Civil Guard post every day. At first, these arrests were 
limited to young men (sons, brothers or cousins of the guerrillas) but were later 
extended to women and older men. Arrests could lead to interrogations in which the 
suspects were beaten or tortured. Electric shocks, having the face submerged in water, 
cigarette burns and beating with vergajos (leather truncheons) were normal practices 
for the forces of law and order of the dictatorship.56 This type of interrogation has rarely 
been reported in official documents, although, exceptionally, an anti-Francoist prisoner 
described the torture sessions he had experienced to a judge.57 Nonetheless, the judges 
never addressed these allegations and the torturers were able to continue their work 
with total impunity for decades. 
 Thousands of go-betweens spent years in prison for their collaboration with the 
guerrilla groups. Giuliana Di Febo reported that “the women’s prisons in Madrid, 
Córdoba, Málaga and Segovia, especially between 1946 and 1948 (the years of maximum 
guerrilla activity and reach) were full of women, young and old, serving sentences of 20 
or 30 years for giving food to a  family member who was a guerrilla”.58 Many go-betweens 
spent months in prison without trial, sometimes even after the death of their guerrilla 
relative. This was the case of the girlfriend, parents and two aunts of Rafael López 
Álvarez, a member of the Agrupación Guerrillera de Granada. Rafael was caught by the 
Civil Guard after a tip-off when on the way to visit his girlfriend. A few minutes later, 
the Civil Guard killed him in front of members of his family, alleging that he was trying 
                                                        
56 Vinyes, R. Irredentas. Las presas políticas y sus hijos en las cárceles franquistas. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2010, 
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57 Military Trial 883/486. Archivo del Tribunal Togado Militar nº 23 de Almería (ATTMA) 
58 Febo, G. di. Resistencia y movimiento de mujeres en España, 1936-1976. Barcelona: Icaria, 1979, p. 78. 
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to escape. The five relatives were immediately sent to prison in Granada, from which, 
after a year without trial, they were released without charge.59   
 The tactic of killing guerrillas and go-betweens and later claiming they had tried 
to escape was applied systematically by the Civil Guard from 1947 onwards, resulting in 
the deaths of hundreds of peasants. It came to the fore in the 19th century as a method 
for combating banditry and is known in Spain as the Ley de Fugas. However, its use by 
the state peaked in the fight against the anti-Francoist guerrilla movement. In the 
provinces of Málaga and Granada, the principal proponent of this “dirty war” tactic was 
Captain Rafael Caballero Ocaña. On 9th March 1947, for example, he arrested three 
inhabitants of Güejar Sierra (Granada) who were go-betweens for the Clares brothers 
group. After being tortured in the police station they declared that they knew the 
whereabouts of some weapons and dynamite which had recently been stolen. The three 
go-betweens led the Civil Guard to the cave where the material was hidden. Rafael 
Caballero then ordered that they be shot in accordance with the Ley de Fugas.60  
Alongside the Ley de Fugas, the Civil Guard employed another counterinsurgency 
tactic which gravely affected the guerrillas and their go-betweens in the community: the 
contrapartidas (contraguerrillas). The contrapartidas were paramilitary groups 
consisting of civil guards and former guerrillas who passed themselves off as real 
guerrillas. The military commanders gave these groups enormous autonomy and made 
little effort to control them in order that they might have free rein to spread terror 
indiscriminately throughout the mountain villages.61 One function of these groups was 
                                                        
59 The case of Rafael López Álvarez is one of two being investigated by an Argentinian court as crimes against 
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60 Military Trial 496/242 (ATTMA) 
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to carry out operations of persecution and repression of the resistance groups. A. 
Hernández, a former Civil Guard, admits that they “were ordered to take no prisoners”.62 
To encourage more violence in these groups, Civil Guards who did not show sufficient 
ferocity were punished.63 Another function was to spread psychological warfare amongst 
the guerrillas’ support networks. The difficulty in distinguishing between real guerrillas 
and contrapartidas served to spread fear amongst the peasants.64 This tactic seriously 
reduced the help given to the guerrillas by those in the community as they were afraid 
of making a mistake and thus giving themselves away.  
As we have seen, Franco’s dictatorship deployed a wide range of counterinsurgency 
techniques against the anti-Francoist guerrillas and these were carried out by both 
employees of the state and by paramilitaries. The methods of this “dirty war” ranged 
from torture, imprisonment and extrajudicial killings to economic repression and 
psychological warfare. Francoist counterinsurgency, widespread and indiscriminate, 
honed its techniques over the years, achieving greatest success between 1947 and 1949 
when the repression was at its height. It was intended not only to engage the armed 
groups in combat but also to destroy the extensive social support networks that the 
guerrilla groups had managed to set up through shared political affinities, kinship, 
friendship and neighbours. The violence and social control imposed by the dictatorship 
in the countryside throughout the 1940s brought about the demise of the anti-Francoist 
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guerrillas in the early 1950s and initiated the rural exodus to the big cities. Here, the 
peasants could be anonymous while rebuilding their lives.65  
 
Conclusions 
In comparison with other parts of Europe the number of deaths directly caused by 
the violence related to the anti-Francoist resistance in post-war Spain would suggest 
that there was a significantly lower level of violence in Spain than elsewhere. However, 
to reduce the question to mere figures would not convey the real extent of the violence. 
Its principal effect, both in the short term and the long term, was to disrupt the solidarity 
and support networks on which the post-war resistance depended and also the social 
structure of the rural communities themselves. It is quite possible that the massive rural 
exodus of the 1950s and 1960s, which depopulated large areas, such as Teruel, was related 
to the political violence and insecurity experienced during the post-war period. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that this violence and the brutalization of social 
relationships was a prolongation of the civil war of 1936; it was the repression 
accompanying the coup and the war that caused the chain reaction which led to the 
formation of armed resistance groups and it was the resolution of the conflict in favour 
of the authors of the coup that permitted the indiscriminate use of violence by the state 
against the “dissenting” civilian population. 
The principal conclusions of this study relate to the clear differences in the use of 
violence by the guerrilla groups and the Franco’s dictatorship. The actions of the former 
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were a result of both political and anthropological reasoning: depending on local 
conflicts and the part played in them by the protagonists, generally guerrilla fighters, 
the action taken by the guerrilla groups were more or less determined by purely local 
reasoning, as in the case of revenge in Gúdar. On the other hand, the guerrillas closest 
to the communist leadership, particularly those in charge, used political and ideological 
reasoning to direct their actions, which, on occasions such as internal purges, were 
directed inwards. In contrast to the reduced and selective nature of the resistance 
movement’s violence and its extreme reactivity to local conflicts, the state’s repressive 
violence appears selective but massive, directed at a large section of the rural population 
whose members were broadly classified as ‘reds’ and dangerous ‘enemies of the 
Fatherland’. There is no doubt of the efficacy of the counterinsurgency strategy: by 1953, 
the guerrilla movement had virtually disappeared from Spain. The regime had not 
hesitated to employ techniques of repression involving extreme violence such as mass 
and extrajudicial killings, against its own people. The pacification of the country, 
accompanied by extensive anti-communist propaganda achieved recognition of the 
Francoist regime and readmission to the international community: in 1953 the USA 
signed several agreements regarding military cooperation with the dictatorship, and, in 
1955, Spain was admitted into the United Nations. 
If the regime was successful in crushing the armed insurrection it was even more 
successful in promoting the omertà surrounding this period of violence, particularly 
where state violence was involved. It was not been until the 2000s and the emergence of 
the “association for the recovery of historical memory” that accounts of the violent 
Francoist repression of the post-war guerrillas and their collaborators from the 
community came to light and entered the public domain. For example, the mass grave 
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containing the remains of the peasants executed by the army after the killings in Gúdar 
was not opened until 2006.66 To understand the mechanisms of consent and social 
control employed by the dictatorship to subdue the countryside and eliminate the last 
vestiges of resistance in the population is to make restitution  for the history of this 
violence in both its state and transnational dimensions: as the definitive consolidation 
of the crushing of a democratic culture which started with the coup of 1936 and as the 
triumph of an anti-antifascist strategy validated by the major powers in the profoundly 
anti-communist context of the Cold War. 
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